By Elvis Eromosele
The decision of the Federal High Court in Abuja to remand Daniel Ojukwu, a journalist with the Foundation for Investigative Journalism (FIJ), at the Kuje Correctional Centre until December 1, 2026, is deeply troubling. Beyond the immediate consequences for the journalist, the ruling raises serious questions about the judiciary’s commitment to protecting fundamental rights, defending press freedom and upholding the principles of justice in a democracy.
It is difficult to understand why a journalist should remain behind bars for weeks while awaiting the hearing of a bail application, particularly when his lawyers informed the court that he had previously been granted administrative bail by the police and had not breached its conditions.
Ojukwu was arraigned before Justice Joyce Abdulmalik of the Federal High Court, Abuja, on a 12-count charge bordering on alleged cyberstalking and criminal defamation. The charges relate to investigative reports published by FIJ between 2023 and 2024 concerning expenditure and projects associated with the Office of the Senior Special Assistant to the President on Sustainable Development Goals, formerly headed by Adejoke Orelope-Adefulire.
The journalist pleaded not guilty.
His lawyers urged the court to allow him to continue enjoying the administrative bail previously granted by the police, pending the determination of his bail application. The court declined, holding that the application, filed on November 9, was not yet ripe for hearing. It consequently ordered his remand until December 1.
That decision deserves serious scrutiny.
Bail is not a declaration of innocence or an attempt to shield an accused person from prosecution. It is an instrument for protecting individual liberty while ensuring that the judicial process proceeds without obstruction.
Ojukwu has not been convicted of any offence. He is presumed innocent under the Constitution and is entitled to defend himself against the allegations. Yet, he remains in custody while awaiting a decision on whether he should be allowed to remain free during trial.
The critical question is: what compelling circumstances justified his continued detention?
If the prosecution has evidence that the journalist poses a flight risk, could interfere with witnesses or might obstruct justice, such concerns should be presented and properly considered. But where the defence maintains that he complied with the conditions of an earlier administrative bail, that argument deserves meaningful judicial attention.
The court may have procedural reasons for declining to hear the application immediately. However, procedure should serve justice, not become an excuse for avoidable hardship. Judicial discretion must be exercised with sensitivity to the fundamental rights at stake.
Perhaps the most disturbing dimension of this case is its connection to investigative reporting on public expenditure.
Among the reports cited in the charges are FIJ investigations questioning payments of about ₦147.1 million for classroom construction projects, another contract reportedly involving ₦47.5 million, and the functionality of solar installations at a school.
These are legitimate matters of public interest. They concern public resources, government projects and the delivery of essential services to Nigerians.
When journalists raise questions about how public money is spent, the expected response from public institutions should be transparency, evidence and accountability. If a report contains inaccuracies, affected parties have legitimate avenues to demand corrections, clarifications or seek legal redress.
Journalists are not above the law, and investigative reporting does not confer immunity from liability. However, criminal prosecution should not become the default response to uncomfortable questions about public expenditure.
There is a fundamental distinction between malicious harassment and legitimate public-interest journalism. That distinction deserves careful judicial examination, particularly when cybercrime and criminal defamation provisions are invoked against media practitioners.
A democracy that criminalises uncomfortable questions risks protecting public officials at the expense of the citizens they serve.
Section 39 of Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution guarantees freedom of expression, including the right to hold opinions and receive and impart information without interference. Section 22 further recognises the responsibility of the mass media to hold government accountable to the people.
These provisions are not decorative statements. They recognise that a free press is indispensable to democratic accountability.
The judiciary, as the institution entrusted with interpreting the law and protecting constitutional rights, should be particularly conscious of the chilling effect its decisions can have on journalism.
When a reporter is remanded over stories concerning public expenditure, other journalists take notice. Editors take notice. Whistleblowers and citizens who might otherwise provide information about suspected wrongdoing also take notice.
The message they may receive is that investigating public officials can carry a personal cost, including imprisonment.
That is a dangerous message for Nigeria’s democracy.
Ojukwu’s present predicament is not his first encounter with law enforcement over the same reports.
In May 2024, he was arrested by officers of the Nigeria Police Force’s Intelligence Response Team and detained for several days before his eventual release following public pressure and protests by journalists and civil society organisations.
More than two years later, the controversy has returned to court, with the journalist facing 12 criminal counts.
This history should make the court particularly sensitive to the possibility that prolonged detention could intimidate not only Ojukwu but also the wider media community.
The number of charges should not substitute for an examination of their substance. Twelve counts do not automatically establish twelve offences, just as publishing an investigative report does not automatically constitute criminal conduct. Every allegation must be tested against the law and the available evidence.
A court may possess the legal authority to remand an accused person, but the existence of that authority does not automatically make every exercise of it proportionate or consistent with the spirit of constitutional democracy.
Judicial independence is not merely freedom from political interference. It also requires the courage to protect individual liberty, especially when an accused person faces the formidable machinery of the state.
The presumption of innocence under Section 36 of the Constitution must mean something in practice. It should not remain an abstract legal principle while accused persons languish in correctional facilities awaiting procedural decisions.
The judiciary must also appreciate that cases involving journalists and public-interest reporting have implications beyond the immediate parties. They affect citizens’ ability to know how public funds are spent and whether government institutions are fulfilling their responsibilities.
The appropriate response to investigative journalism is not intimidation. It is transparency, evidence and accountability.
Ultimately, the allegations against Ojukwu must be determined through a fair judicial process. If the prosecution has a legitimate case, it should present its evidence and allow the defence to challenge it. But the period before trial should not become punishment in itself.
The court should urgently reconsider the circumstances of his detention and grant him bail on reasonable conditions pending trial.
Nigeria cannot claim to be strengthening its democracy while journalists face the prospect of prolonged imprisonment over investigations into matters of public interest.
Ojukwu’s case is bigger than one journalist, one media organisation or one former public official. It is a test of whether Nigeria’s institutions understand that public office comes with public scrutiny, that accountability requires an independent press and that the liberty of an accused person must not be treated casually.
A free press is not an inconvenience to democracy. It is one of its most important safeguards. When the courts fail to protect that principle, the damage extends far beyond the journalist sitting in the dock.
